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Could There Be A Superhuman Species? 
David S. Oderberg 
 
Abstract: 
Transhumanism is the school of thought that advocates the use of 
technology to enhance the human species, to the point where some 
supporters consider that a new species altogether could arise. Even some 
critics think this at least a technological possibility. Some supporters also 
believe the emergence of a new, improved, superhuman species raises no 
special ethical questions. Through an examination of the metaphysics of 
species, and an analysis of the essence of the human species, I argue that 
the existence of an embodied, genuinely superhuman species is a 
metaphysical impossibility. Finally, I point out an interesting ethical 
consideration that this metaphysical truth raises. 
 
Keywords: transhumanism, posthumanism, species, essentialism 
 
1. Introduction 
Transhumanism is a hydra-headed movement embracing a multitude of 
streams of thought. At the more moderate end, transhumanists advocate 
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the use of technology
1
 and ‘applied reason’ with the aim of 
‘fundamentally improving the human condition’.2 At the more radical 
end, transhumanists promote the use of technology for such things as: 
extreme cognitive and physical enhancement; massive life extension, 
even physical or mental immortality; the abolition of all human suffering; 
the elimination of gender; hastening the ‘technological singularity’3, in 
which, through artificial intelligence, biological enhancement and/or 
biological-mechanical synthesis, superintelligence emerges, outstripping 
mere human intelligence; and sundry other objectives. 
                                                 
 
1
 In particular the so-called NBIC technologies: nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
information technology, and cognitive science. The acronym came into public use via 
the National Science Foundation-funded report edited by M.C. Roco and W.S. 
Bainbridge, Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2003), available online at 
http://www.wtec.org/ConvergingTechnologies/Report/NBIC_report.pdf [accessed 4 
Jan. 2012]. 
2
 N. Bostrom, ‘The Transhumanist FAQ’, pub. World Transhumanist Association, 
v.2.1 (2003): 4, at http://www.transhumanism.org/resources/FAQv21.pdf [accessed 4 
Jan. 2012]. 
3
 A term introduced by the science fiction writer Vernor Vinge in the 1980s and 
1990s, and popularized by the futurist Ray Kurzweil in 2005. For further references 
and historical background, see D.J. Chalmers, ‘The Singularity: A Philosophical 
Analysis’, esp. sec. 1, Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (2010): 7-65. 
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I want to focus on one of the more extreme claims of a minority of 
transhumanists – that enhancement technologies could, through 
‘participant evolution’, be used to create an entirely new species. This 
‘posthuman’ species would not consist of human beings with enhanced 
abilities – mere transhumans4 – but of a new kind of being, wholly 
superior to humans in sufficient respects for it plausibly to be called a 
distinct species. Who makes such a claim or at least thinks it a 
possibility? The scenario is entertained as a technological possibility by 
Lee Silver.
5
 David Chalmers implicitly thinks so as well, when he says in 
passing: ‘given the choice between emulating and enhancing human 
beings and creating an objectively better species, it is possible to see the 
moral calculus  as  going  either  way.’6 John Harris also thinks induced 
speciation is possible but does not consider it to have any distinctive 
ethical dimension.
7
 The roboticist Hans Moravec expects intelligent 
                                                 
 
4
 The terminology in this area is fluid, with the same term sometimes given different 
meanings and conversely. My use of ‘transhuman’ and ‘posthuman’, although 
somewhat stipulative, seems to be in line with common usage among transhumanists. 
5
 L.M. Silver, Remaking Eden (New York: Avon Books, 1997). 
6
 ‘The Singularity’: 33. 
7
 John Harris, Enhancing Evolution: The Ethical Case for Making Better People 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007): 37-9. 
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machines to take over the earth as a new species dominating mankind
8
 
(often referred to as ‘apocalyptic AI’ or the ‘apocalyptic scenario’9). 
Some critics of transhumanism also assume that technology could in 
principle produce a new species.
10
 A perusal of the various popular 
outlets for transhumanist thought shows that posthuman speciation, 
whether directed or a result of ongoing natural processes, is considered at 
least a possibility if not highly likely.
11
 
 
2. Some brief stage setting on the metaphysics of species 
When it comes to the question of what a species is, what we have is not 
an embarrassment of riches but a simple embarrassment. On one oft-cited 
count, there are over twenty ‘species concepts’ in current debate, each 
                                                 
 
8
 H. Moravec, Robot: Mere Machine to Transcendent Mind (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). 
9
 R.M. Geraci, Apocalyptic AI (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
10
 G. J. Annas, L. B. Andrews, and R. M. Isasi, ‘Protecting the Endangered Human: 
Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations’, 
American Journal of Law and Medicine 28 (2002):151-178, at pp.153-4, 161-2, 173. 
11
 See, for example, the interview with geneticist Bruce Lahn in h+ magazine, one of 
the most prominent transhumanist publications: 
http://hplusmagazine.com/2011/05/12/bruce-lahn-interview/ [accessed 5 Jan. 2012]. 
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with its philosophical and/or biological advocates.
12
 Part of the reason for 
this bewildering array of proposals is the tendency of many biologists to 
ignore the crucial philosophical element of the ‘species problem’, treating 
the latter as no more than a task for empirical science to sort out and any 
philosophizing about it to be obscurely metaphysical. Combine this with 
a natural tendency to pragmatism and instrumentalism (in the loose 
sense) among working scientists, and we have some explanation for the 
willingness of not a few theorists about species to let a hundred flowers 
bloom: what a species is depends on your theoretical interests, how you 
carve up the world of individual organisms, and so on.
13
 
                                                 
 
12
 R.L. Mayden, ‘A  Hierarchy  of  Species  Concepts:  The  Denouement  in  the 
Saga of the Species Problem’, in M. F. Claridge, H. A. Dawah, and M. R. Wilson, 
(eds) Species: The Units of Biodiversity (London: Chapman and Hall, 1997): 381-424. 
For an overview of twenty-six species concepts (Mayden has at least twenty-two), see 
J. Wilkins, ‘Species, Kinds, and Evolution’, Reports of the National Center for 
Science Education 26 (2006): 36-45; available at http://ncse.com/rncse/26/4/species-
kinds-evolution [accessed 5 Jan. 2012]. 
13
 Philip Kitcher is a prominent defender of pluralism: ‘Species’, in M. Ereshefsky 
(ed.) The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species (Cambridge, MA: 
Bradford Books, 1992): 317-41. See further R.A. Richards, The Species Problem: A 
Philosophical Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): ch.5. 
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It is the lack of seriousness in some quarters about the 
philosophical component of the species problem that is my concern here. 
To be sure, many others – such as Michael Ghiselin14 – take the 
philosophical aspect of the problem seriously. I submit that the species 
problem just is a philosophical problem – insoluble without careful 
attention to the biological facts, but not tractable at the level of biology 
itself. Specifically, when asking what a species is, we are asking a 
metaphysical question about the real definition of an organism.
15
 The 
definition provides the constituents of the essence of the species and of 
the organisms that belong to it. At this point many if not most biologists 
and philosophers of biology will switch off: if what I am arguing for 
depends on biological essentialism, then the argument must go wrong 
somewhere.
16
 So here is an attempt at eirenicism: my answer to the 
                                                 
 
14
 ‘The species problem has to do with biology, but it is fundamentally a philosophical 
problem’: see M. Ghiselin, ‘A  Radical  Solution  to  the  Species  Problem’, 
Systematic  Zoology  23 (1974): 536-544; reprinted in Ereshefsky (ed.), The Units of 
Evolution: 279-92; quotation from p.285. 
15
 This applies in general to any object, but I restrict the term ‘species’ here to its 
biological use. 
16
 Biological essentialism is, though, undergoing a small revival. See David S. 
Oderberg, Real Essentialism (London: Routledge, 2007), and also: D. Walsh, 
‘Evolutionary Essentialism’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 
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question of whether there could be a distinct ‘superhuman’ species 
requires only a few modest assumptions which, whilst they might with 
further argument entail full-blown essentialism, do not require the latter 
for the argument to go through: 
 Assumption 1: There are definite answers to at least some 
questions of the form ‘Is a the same species as b?’ 
 Assumption 2: There are criteria for providing those definite 
answers. 
 Assumption 3: Whilst we might not have metaphysically 
necessary and sufficient conditions for species identity, there 
are at least some cases in which we have metaphysically 
sufficient conditions. 
As to the first assumption, all we need to admit is that some kinds 
of organism clearly belong to the same species no matter how you 
plausibly slice the biological cake, and others to different species. Tom 
and Jerry belong to different species; Clever Hans and Sea Biscuit belong 
to the same species, without a shadow of a doubt. As to the third 
assumption: in any possible world – restrict accessibility if you wish to 
nomologically identical worlds – in which an organism is a water-
                                                                                                                                           
 
425–48; M. Devitt, ‘Resurrecting Biological Essentialism’, Philosophy of Science 75 
(2008): 344-82. 
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dwelling vertebrate with gills in the mature case, that organism is a fish. 
In any world, any organism that breathes air, produces and regulates its 
temperature from within its own bodily surface, has hair, three middle ear 
bones and mammary glands functional in the females with young, is a 
mammal. It’s not simply that we have stipulated that all such organisms 
be called ‘mammals’, but that they all have sufficient in common to be 
definitely of the same species. Note well: I am not restricting the term 
‘species’ to metaphysically infima species, as per biological taxonomy, 
but to any natural kind of organism in the hierarchy of classification (in 
other words, any taxon). This is one way in which there is a fundamental 
metaphysical component to questions of kind membership: we are 
interested in all the real, objective groupings of organisms, not just those 
at the lowest level. (In biological taxonomy, mammals are at the level of 
class.) 
What about the second assumption, that there are criteria – non-
arbitrary, non-conventional, and so on – for determining answers to some 
questions of species identity? The species problem bites back hard at this 
point, but all I can do here is state that the criteria I favour are 
morphological: they appeal to the appearance, structure, and 
characteristic function of organisms – morphē in all its traditional 
Aristotelian glory. The general reason in favour of morphology over other 
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criteria is that all the others seem, in one way or another, either to 
piggyback on morphology or to sidestep it in favour of other 
considerations that to the unprejudiced eye look simply irrelevant. For 
example, why would a taxonomist be in the least interested in genetic 
criteria if they did not correlate closely with appearance, structure, and 
function? In fact they do, as we know; and so the only reason to be 
interested in them as markers of species identity is that different genes 
express different characteristics, whether at the macro- or micro-level. 
For suppose you had two organisms with identical genotypes and yet 
different morphologies. (Maybe Tom and Jerry, in some world, turn out 
to be genetically identical.) What possible reason would there be for 
insisting on their belonging to the same species in that world?
17
 Suppose 
                                                 
 
17
 A nice example, illustrating what is called ‘cryptic speciation’, is the recent 
discovery that the freshwater worm called Lumbriculus variegatus is actually two 
distinct species differing in DNA, despite the identity in appearance of all specimens 
and their similar natural locations. One of the researchers, Christer Erséus, said: 
‘Different species have different characteristics. If it emerged that these two species 
differ in terms of their tolerance towards certain toxins, then it could be difficult to 
make comparisons between different studies.’ The point, for our purposes, is that the 
mere genetic difference does not - and should not - matter. What is important is 
whether this shows up in differences of characteristic behaviour and function, such as 
toxin resistance. And that is a matter of morphology. (Mere visual appearance is never 
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Sea Biscuit and Clever Hans had virtually none of their genes in 
common. (They would have to have some, being animals; suppose they 
both had the same Hox genes
18
 and the same Boule gene,
19
 but nothing 
else.) What good reason could we have for separating them into distinct 
species, assuming their morphologies were exactly the same as in our 
world where their genotypes massively overlap? It is beside the point to 
reply that morphology is (in some appropriate sense) determined by 
genetics: we can adhere to morphological criteria of identity without 
denying that morphology has an underlying cause. We are interested in 
the criteria, not their causes –  except insofar as the causes have certain 
effects – and if the causes in the actual world were different in some other 
world, while morphology was held constant, this would not imply that 
morphology ceased to be the proper identity criterion. In brief, if you are 
                                                                                                                                           
 
the whole morphological story.) See further D.A. Price and C. Erséus, ‘Genetic 
variation in the popular lab worm Lumbriculus variegatus (Annelida: Clitellata: 
Lumbriculidae) reveals cryptic speciation’, Molecular Phylogenetics and Evolution 51 
(2009): 182-9; and the article ‘Animals That Seem Identical May Be Completely 
Different Species’, ScienceDaily, 22 April 2009, at 
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/04/090422121858.htm [last accessed 16 
April 2012]. 
18
 Regulating body plan development. 
19
 Regulating gametogenesis. 
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interested in species identity, why care about genes except for what they 
do? 
An example of irrelevance, on the other hand, comes from the 
ever-onwards march of phylogenetic species concepts. What they all have 
in common is the focus on evolutionary origin as the criterion of 
demarcation. Cladistics, for instance, holds that species (and higher taxa, 
but recall that I am using ‘species’ to include all taxa) are sections of the 
tree of life marked by branching points and most recent common 
ancestors.
20
 The motivation behind origin-based species concepts is to 
bring the admittedly messy state of current taxonomy into some sort of 
order by aligning it with what we know about the evolutionary descent of 
organisms. Cladism itself has a number of problems,
21
 but the more 
general worry about all phylogenetic concepts is why anyone should want 
to mix classification with origin. After all, with enough knowledge we 
could track the evolution (in the loose sense) of all the chemical elements 
since the Big Bang. Hydrogen, so physicists think, came into existence at 
least three minutes after the origin of the universe.
22
 They have a model 
of how it and many other elements were synthesized over time out of pre-
                                                 
 
20
 See, for example, M. Ridley, Evolution (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993). 
21
 See Oderberg, Real Essentialism: ch.9.2. 
22
 S. Weinberg, The First Three Minutes (London: Fontana, 1983): 16. 
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existing particles. Yet this is not how we classify hydrogen, or helium, or 
for that matter gold and lead. We classify them by appearance (not 
necessarily at the macro level, of course), chemical and physical 
structure, and characteristic behaviour. Why should the classification of 
biological species be any different, other than due to the misguided idea – 
an ideological prejudice, I would call it – that if we inject phylogeny into 
the very concept of what a species is and how species differ from one 
another, and can arrive at a workable system of classification, we shall 
have an indirect methodological vindication of evolution itself? It is hard 
to see how the same approach applied to chemical classification would 
yield indirect vindication of the Big Bang model. More importantly, it is 
difficult to understand how what a thing is can have anything to do where 
it came from unless the thing itself is independently understood to be 
historical in nature – such as a familial lineage, or a history, or maybe a 
legend. We cannot, however, say that biological taxonomy must appeal to 
lineage because species are essentially historical: not only because I am 
not presupposing full-blown essentialism here, but because to do so 
would evidently be circular, assuming that the only reason for thinking 
species to be essentially historical is that they are defined by their 
ancestry. 
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3. What are we? 
Plenty more could be said about morphology as the preferred criterion of 
species identity; I have only been able to offer enough in favour of taking 
it seriously, and for the purpose of setting the scene for what follows. 
Some transhumanists, as remarked earlier, think a new species could be 
induced from our own by technology. (They take it as given that this will 
happen eventually by natural selection; they simply want to hurry things 
up.) Now whether this ‘superhuman’ species is indeed distinct from our 
own – whether it is genuinely posthuman or merely human – depends on 
what we are and what it is. I take what we are to be what our form is, i.e. 
our morphology, and that is to be a rational animal. Such is the hallowed 
Aristotelian definition of the human being – an animal endowed with 
reason. 
To say that the human being is a rational animal looks, at first, very 
little like what you would find in a biology text. You will be told that 
humans are members of the species Homo sapiens, or the sub-species 
Homo sapiens sapiens.
23
 You will be informed of the descent of modern 
                                                 
 
23
 Depending on whether modern humans are distinguished as a sub-species of the 
genus homo from Homo sapiens idaltu and Homo sapiens neanderthalensis – all 
highly controversial to say the least, and hinging, unsurprisingly, partly on what is 
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humans via a long line of hominids; also that they are primates whose 
closest genetic relative is the chimpanzee or (for some biologists) the 
orang utan. ‘Rational animal’ is not a term to use in polite biological 
company. 
Yet appearances can be deceptive. Sensing the truth in the very 
species name, when one inspects the detail, the consensus appears 
unanimous that rationality is the hallmark of the human animal, whether 
this be characterized in terms of abstract thought, language use, the most 
sophisticated technical ability, self-consciousness, introspection, moral 
behaviour, advanced social interaction, and so on.
24
 We are animals, to be 
sure; we are set apart from all other species by rationality; so does it not 
follow that we are rational animals? It quickly gets more complicated, 
however. For suppose evidence of rationality, say in the form of 
handmade tools or other artefacts, were found associated with early 
                                                                                                                                           
 
meant by ‘species’. See, for an overview of Neanderthals, R. Lewin, Human 
Evolution: An Illustrated Introduction (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005; 5
th
 ed.): ch.27. 
24
 See, for instance, W. Henke, ‘Human Biological Evolution’, in F.M. Wuketits and 
F.J. Ayala (eds) Handbook of Evolution vol. 2: The Evolution of Living Systems 
(Including Hominids) (Weinheim: Wiley-VCH, 2005): ch.6, at p.118. 
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hominids, several million years before the appearance of Homo sapiens.
25
 
Homo habilis, considered a precursor of Homo sapiens, may have made 
and used tools in a human-like way. Maybe he was rational, for all we 
know. He looked very little like us, judging by reconstructions from skull 
fragments. For the biologist, then, it is not just rationality but quite 
specific bodily shape and structure that make for a genuine human being. 
Moreover, were we non-specialists to see Homo habilis crossing the road, 
we would hardly acknowledge him to be ‘one of us’.  
Yet why wouldn’t we? A relatively cheap remark invites itself 
here, to the effect that humans have long had false opinions about which 
beings were human: consider Ota Benga, the African pygmy put on 
display in the Bronx Zoo in 1906 with an orang utan and a parrot.
26
 In the 
present day, even, the Bantu consider pygmies ‘not truly human’.27 A 
more substantive point in favour of making a species distinction is the 
phylogenetic one: Homo habilis came before Homo sapiens. But 
                                                 
 
25
 For speculation on this, see R.L. Susman, ‘Fossil Evidence for Early Hominid Tool 
Use’, Science 265 (1994): 1570-3. 
26
 P.V. Bradford and H. Blume, Ota Benga: The Pygmy in the Zoo (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1992). 
27
 P. Raffaele, ‘The Pygmies’ Plight’, Smithsonian Magazine, Sept. 2008, at 
http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/The-Pygmies-
Plight.html?c=y&page=1 [last accessed 6 Jan. 2012]. 
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wouldn’t this reason on its own merely beg the question of why temporal 
priority in the phylogenetic tree should make a difference? More 
precisely, the circularity involved in appealing solely to temporal priority 
would be that of taking the relevant priority to be one in which speciation 
is assumed. In other words, there is an innocent reading of ‘temporally 
prior’, namely that Homo habilis existed before (or long before) Homo 
sapiens, to which the response is – so what? And there is a non-innocent 
reading, according to which Homo habilis is not human – not one of us 
humans – because it is an earlier species in the phylogenetic tree. Clearly 
this will not do. 
That it does not do is shown by the fact that taxonomists do not 
appeal to mere temporal priority: such an appeal is more the stuff of 
casual banter that is the staple of popular discourse about evolution. For 
palaeoanthropologists tell us also that Homo habilis was, bodily, very 
unlike modern humans, with less than half the brain size, 
disproportionately long arms, and a distinctively ape-like appearance.
28
 
But the question then arises: why should any of that make a difference? 
After all, if humans are rational animals, then Homo habilis, on the 
assumption I made about rationality, would also count as human – not 
                                                 
 
28
 For an overview, see B. Wood and M. Collard, ‘The Human Genus’, Science 284 
(1999): 65-71. 
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merely a member of the genus Homo as taxonomists now have it, but as 
one of us, metaphysically speaking. But let me put our putative ancestors 
to one side and take on far more radical scenarios, for if the case can be 
made for these it can be made for any actual biological ancestor of ours 
that was also rational. 
 
4. Exotic rational animals 
John Locke famously thought that a rational parrot would be a person but 
not a human being. Rational parrots would, he considered, ‘have passed 
for a race of rational animals’ but they would nevertheless have been 
parrots, not men: ‘For I presume it is not the idea of a thinking or rational 
being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people’s sense: but of a 
body, so and so shaped, joined to it: and if that be the idea of a man, the 
same successive body not shifted all at once, must, as well as the same 
immaterial spirit, go to the making of the same man.’29 Leibniz does not 
demur: ‘there is no obstacle to there being rational animals of some other 
species than ours. … Indeed it does seem that the deﬁnition of “man” as 
“rational animal” needs to be ampliﬁed by something about the shape and 
                                                 
 
29
 J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: II.xxvii.8, P.H. Nidditch 
(ed.) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975): 332-5. 
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anatomy of the body; otherwise, according to my views, Spirits would 
also be men.’30 
Is this view, accepted by pretty much every philosopher at least 
since Locke and Leibniz, correct? A couple of small points first. Locke 
speaks of ‘the idea of a man in most people’s sense’, what we might call 
the nominal idea or perhaps nominal definition of ‘man’. Reference to 
body plan will be found in any dictionary or encyclopaedia entry for 
‘human’, as in academic texts. But this nominal idea might be wrong. 
Maybe we just haven’t thought about the issue hard enough. The first 
fishermen may well have thought that all fish had scales, but they would 
have been wrong. The second point is that Leibniz thinks that without 
supplementing ‘rational animal’ with reference to the ‘shape and anatomy 
of the body’, spirits would also be men. Yet this does not follow, since 
spirits by definition are not animals and do not have bodies at all.  
A mistake about whether all fish have scales looks purely the result 
of inadequate empirical information. Yet when it comes to classification, 
it is hard to separate the empirical and the metaphysical components. It is 
an empirical matter whether catfish have scales (they do not), but a 
largely metaphysical matter whether they are still to be classified as fish. 
                                                 
 
30
 G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding: II.xxvii.8, P. Remnant and J. 
Bennett (eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996): 234-5. 
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That they behave in a characteristic way similar enough to a certain class 
of other water-dwellers to be counted as members of that class is a matter 
of abstracting what is common to particular empirical cases, and this is a 
metaphysical task – one performed equally by a biologist studying fish 
and (with less overall accuracy) by a fisherman trawling a lake. 
So if we assumed Locke to be mistaken about the rational parrot, 
we could not conclude that this must be due to a mere lack of empirical 
information and then wonder (for reductio purposes) what this could 
possibly be. Still, this could be the cause. Locke has the parrot carrying 
out a few simple conversations in ‘Brazilian’,31 but what if we augmented 
its talent by giving it the full panoply of human conversational ability? 
What if it could pass an avian version of the Turing Test, its squawky 
voice suitably masked to sound like that of a middle-aged woman? To the 
question, ‘How could you possibly think this was a human?’, knowing 
now that our interlocutor had the body of a parrot, why could one not 
riposte: ‘And how could anyone possibly think this was a parrot?’ 
Which is where the threat of stalemate looms, unless broken by the 
seemingly compulsory move of classifying Locke’s parrot as a person of 
a different species to humans and parrots. Note: this is not the move 
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WARNING – AUTHOR COPY ONLY. NOT OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. NOT 
FOR CITATION. OFFICIAL VERSION IS PUBLISHED IN: The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 52 (2014): 206-26 
                                                                                                                     20 
 
 
Locke makes. Nowhere does he assert that what seems to be a parrot is a 
person of an altogether different species. Rather, he makes it quite clear 
that the creature in question is both a person and a parrot, an intuition 
shared by E.J. Lowe.
32
 To which I submit we should reply, following 
Kripke and Putnam, that such a creature would be no more a parrot than a 
pencil could (in the metaphysical sense) be an organism or a cat could be 
a robot.
33
 Again, if there is a minimal essentialism here, so be it: whatever 
a parrot could be, it could not be a person.
34
 A creature with rationality 
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and the appearance of a parrot would, à la Kripke’s cat-like demons,35 be 
a person in a parrot-like form (‘form’ being used by Kripke in its 
vernacular sense of ‘appearance’, not in the technical Aristotelian sense 
of morphology – total structure and function.) 
This is but an assertion I must leave unargued, since the burden of 
the discussion concerns, not what a so-called rational parrot could not be, 
but what it would be. And my claim is that it would be not only a person 
but a human person, i.e. a human being.
36
 In other words, being a rational 
animal simpliciter is sufficient to make the so-called rational parrot one 
of us, that is, sufficiently like us to count as one of our species. The 
reason is that all rational animals share the two characteristics that matter 
most in constituting the way in which they fundamentally live and act in 
the world. Being rational, the rational animal has the capacity for such 
things as: abstract thought, that is, the ability to abstract from particulars 
to reach general judgments involving concepts; language; knowledge of 
why it does many of the things it does, what Aristotelians call knowledge 
                                                                                                                                           
 
could not be; and even here I am not offering an exhaustive list of the things a parrot 
could not be, only one example. 
35
 Naming and Necessity: 126. 
36
 I make no distinctions here (or elsewhere) between human beings and human 
persons. 
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of finality; the conscious ordering of ends or objectives; development of 
and adherence to a life plan; reflection, meditation, puzzlement over, 
attempts to understand and resolve, matters concerning its own life, the 
lives of others (be they rational or not), the state of the world, the 
connections between things and events; a moral life, with all that is 
entailed by a grasp of morality as a system of norms for living. We can 
easily add to the list, of course: humour, irony, aesthetic sensibility, the 
creation and maintenance of families and political societies…we all know 
the sorts of things we rational animals are capable of.  
Now I do not wish, or need, to begin the difficult task of drawing 
all the logical and conceptual connections between these multifarious 
aspects of life as a rational animal. All I claim here is that rationality as 
the capacity for abstract conceptual thought is explanatorily basic relative 
to a large number of the sorts of characteristic listed here. Language is the 
most important case in point. Abstraction from particulars and ascent to 
the level of conceptual thought necessarily involves some kind of 
representational system because it essentially involves the composition 
and division of concepts: mental elements are put together or divided in 
order to make judgments, and judgments are put together to make 
inferences. The elements have to have some kind of meaningful structure, 
by which I mean a structure involving at least the basic operations of 
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reference, predication, logical operation, and the like, put together in a 
certain way, such that other ways of combination are excluded. A 
creature that can do all of this must have language; in fact, language is 
what I have just described. 
One wonders, moreover, just what rationality could be for a 
creature that did not have any of this repertoire. Ethologists with an axe 
to grind might like to appeal to some kind of complex problem-solving, 
or perhaps a set of specific social interactions supposedly manifesting a 
highly developed sense of self and other, and the like. But to take this 
tiny subset of the things that we do, the paradigmatic rational animals – 
the only ones we know of in the universe – and treat it as a surrogate for 
the whole says more about a prior agenda than it does about what marks 
us rational animals out as distinctive among all living creatures. The 
linguistic capacity is a direct result of, if not identical with, the capacity 
for abstract thought, and it makes possible most of the other features 
enumerated earlier. To take some feature or other and elevate it to the 
status of ‘mark of rationality’ on its own is misleading precisely because 
it draws attention to a kind of ability – problem-solving, say, or the 
making of artefacts – that is language-like while severing the genuine 
linguistic element that gives the ability any special interest in the first 
place. 
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It is one thing, however, to insist that all rational animals have 
language,
37
 and another that they must be capable of communication. We 
can now bring in animality to say something about this. All rational 
animals are, by definition, living things. To live is to have a certain kind 
of body, one that can sustain the so-called vegetative operations of 
nutrition, metabolism, reproduction, self-preservation, homeostasis, and 
so on. In addition, animals have sensation, the ability to pick up and 
process information from their environment, distinguishing the harmful 
from the beneficial, avoiding or repelling the former and employing the 
latter in the vegetative functions. Now, leaving aside the question of a 
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 The question as to whether rationality entails language is controversial, and my 
brief remarks are not intended to sweep a significant debate under the carpet. Much 
depends, of course, on what one means by ‘rational’ and by ‘having language’. 
Fodor’s ‘language of thought’ hypothesis, for example, relies on a computational 
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The tie to language, for him, involves computation over contentful syntactic structures 
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singleton rational animal necessarily alone in some environment (not 
something transhumanists are interested in anyway), if we have: several 
rational animals, each knowing the other is rational (since rationality 
entails being able to recognize similarities, including the presence of 
rationality outside oneself at least in some circumstances), all employing 
the same generic vegetative functions, with the same generic sensory 
abilities, in the same environment, then at the very least it is highly likely 
they will communicate with each other. Why must they be able to? Take 
a simple line of thought: a rational animal will want to know the answer 
to something; so it will pose a question; and if it recognizes another 
rational animal that might know the answer, it will pose it to the other. If 
the animal has language, can ask a question, wants an answer, and thinks 
it can get one from another animal, does it not have everything it needs to 
be able to communicate? And if it can, why would it not? Don’t we 
rational animals show exactly how this works? 
So we can be fairly certain that all rational animals are able to 
communicate. What we haven’t shown yet is that they can all 
communicate with each other. What we do know is that they can all 
attempt to communicate with each other, for the same reason that they 
can successfully communicate with some others. That some rational 
animals might not be interested in communicating with others is 
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irrelevant, as is the fact that rational animals suffering some kind of 
deformity, damage, or environmental limitation might not be able to 
communicate at all (‘able’ in the Aristotelian sense of ‘first 
actuality/second potentiality’). The only other thing that would prevent 
actual communication between some rational animals is a lack of uptake 
due to untranslatability. 
At this point I am quite unashamedly going to put to one side 
general questions of a Quinean sort concerning radical translation, 
inscrutability of reference, and underdetermination of theory by 
behavioural data.
38
 For if these are genuine problems (which I doubt),
39
 
they are problems for all radical translation, including that between the 
only rational animals we know of – us in the sense of Homo sapiens. 
Since I am simply assuming that we Homo sapiens do successfully 
engage in translation as radical as we can find,
40
 the question is not 
whether, given Quinean worries, such translation is possible in general, 
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 W.V. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960) and elsewhere. 
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 For a useful critique, see H. Glock, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and 
Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
40
 With a few exceptions such as Linear A and Etruscan, but who knows whether we 
will translate those one day? We managed with Egyptian hieroglyphics and Linear B 
despite the sceptics. 
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but whether there is some other reason of principle preventing it in the 
case of rational animals very different from us Homo sapiens – whether 
parrot-like rational animals, rational Martians, or some future posthuman 
of a kind significantly different from our own. It is hard, for me at least, 
to see what sort of reason there could be apart from general sceptical 
worries about whether there is a single world we and they inhabit (we and 
the rational Martian inhabit the same world even though we are on Earth 
and they are on Mars) and whether, if so, their experience of it is so 
radically different from our own that we simply cannot communicate 
with each other about what we experience. 
Again, I am going simply to assume that we all inhabit a single 
world. For a sceptic about this (such as a devotee of the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis),
41
 nothing I say will have much force. I will also assume the 
possibility that some of our and their experiences are so different that we 
cannot talk to each other about them. For a sceptic about all such 
experiences, however, there will be nothing much here to persuade them 
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out of their scepticism. It might be objected at this point that I have made 
my case easy by shunting aside all the most interesting and pressing 
objections! Yet all of these general sceptical worries can be applied, and 
have been, to the possibility of communication between at least some 
Homo sapiens and others. Do we all inhabit a single world? Do we all 
carve it up in the same way? Are our experiences commensurable? If this 
is what bothers you, then you will see the question of transhumanist 
species membership as just more of the same. I am not bothered by any of 
this: I take it for granted that all Homo sapiens can in principle 
communicate with each other. What I am concerned with is the case of 
radically different rational animals. And here is where a more interesting 
objection comes into play, namely that whereas communication between 
Homo sapiens is possible precisely because of our identical body plan – 
the animal part of our natures – this will not be the case with a radically 
different rational animal. Moreover, we can ignore sceptical worries 
about how our fellow Homo sapiens experience the world since we make 
sound inferences to the best explanation of how they function in terms of 
how their bodies causally interact with their surroundings. 
So consider a mythical rational animal, Glog. He/she – better it – 
has three heads full of liquid hydrogen, seventeen sensory organs, and 
twelve tentacles of varying lengths placed strategically around a spherical 
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body of thixotropic clay. For nutrition it sucks in helium through a glass 
tube, expels xenon as waste, reproduces by shaking itself into liquid pools 
that reassemble into similar bodies, and gets about by magnetic levitation. 
Clearly we can make no (obvious) inferences about how it experiences 
the world from its causal interaction with the environment. I would still 
call Glog a human being, but isn’t that simply incredible? Not if you 
remember that Glog is rational. Glog will, as I argued, attempt to 
communicate with us Homo sapiens, barring lack of interest or some 
other contingent environmental factor. If its alien language is 
untranslatable, that will only be for technical reasons, not reasons of 
principle. We might not be smart enough to decipher what Glog is saying. 
We might not have the sensory organs for receiving its mode of 
communication. A host of reasons such as these might prevent uptake. 
But why should they prevent us from counting Glog as one of us? What 
reason of principle is there for saying that we could never communicate 
with each other? Suppose we could. Glog speaks via microwave pulses, 
so we use a microwave pulse detector to pick up the signals. Where we 
see trees, Glog sees vibrating atoms; so we tool up some appropriate 
scanning tunnelling microscopy for seeing what Glog sees. If we notice 
Glog acting as though in distress in a helium-deficient environment such 
as a chamber filled with xenon, we might think about adding some 
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helium and taking out some xenon. And so on. Presumably Glog will try 
to thank us! Might it thank us by trying to exterminate us? If you think 
that a possibility, then you haven’t understood what it means to express 
gratitude. If Glog is rational, and it wants to thank us, it won’t try to kill 
us. If it is rational, grateful and evil it might, but that’s a different matter. 
All of this is fun speculation, the stuff of which careers in science 
fiction are made. The philosophical point is that, being rational, Glog has 
the characteristics I listed earlier. Glog will have a life plan; it will be 
able to order priorities and objectives; it will worry and wonder about 
things, try to solve its deepest problems, consider its mortality,
42
 
contemplate the world and its own mind, and when it encounters us 
Homo sapiens, wonder about just what we are like, having a mirror image 
of the concerns we have about it. Technical problems aside, once we get 
some basic communication going, what more is there to add if we are to 
count Glog as one of us – a human, i.e. a rational animal? The word 
‘human’ is what creates so much of the roadblock to thinking in this way 
about exotic rational animals. We take it to be a term whose extension is 
exclusively biologically determined, but where ‘biological’ has a narrow 
sense encompassing only genetics, phylogenetics, and the study of 
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 I take physical immortality not to be an option if the laws of nature are as we think 
they are. 
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vegetative (and to some extent sensory) function. Here already we go 
astray since, being an animal, Glog does have the same vegetative and 
sensory functions as us at the appropriate level of generality.
43
 Having 
additional sensory modalities, whilst perhaps blocking the ability to 
communicate about some aspect of reality, does not obstruct all 
communication; nor does having the same modalities but using them in a 
different way. Glog still picks up particular sensory information, 
processes it, forms concepts and composes them into judgments and 
inferences. If there were some other way for a bodily creature to know 
about the world, it would be interesting to learn what it was. 
We go wrong more significantly in conceiving of biology in an 
unduly restrictive way. When biologists, as they usually do in describing 
Homo sapiens, refer to the manifestations of rationality, not just 
animality, are they doing biology? In the narrow sense, no: they should 
stick to genetics and descent. In the broad sense, of course they are: to do 
biology in this sense you have to do psychology as well. Indeed, it is the 
Aristotelian’s lament that psychology, which used to mean ‘the science of 
life’ (psūche = life principle), has, in relatively recent history, become the 
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science of the mind, with biology narrowly conceived being split off into 
a different discipline – as though you could study rationality without ipso 
facto studying animality, and vice versa. 
To think correctly about the issue before us, we should either force 
ourselves to think of the term ‘human’ in more broadly biological terms, 
or else abandon it pro tem and just use the term ‘rational animal’. This 
will enable us to put methodological bias to one side and consider simply 
the metaphysics of the matter. Metaphysically, Glog is one of us in all 
that counts. 
Finally, before putting Glog to rest, we should note the following. 
There is, of course, a very important sense in which Glog is not one of us, 
any more than a Great Dane is one of the Chihuahuas. Glog is not a 
distinct species from us under the genus rational animal. Rather, it is a 
distinct variety from us under the infima species rational animal. That we 
and Glog could not interbreed is, as we know, not a defeater for being of 
the same species even in the narrow biological sense (let alone the 
broader one): ring species, such as the Ensatina salamander (Ensatina 
eschscholtzii) in California and the Greenish Warbler (Phylloscopus 
trochiloides) in the Himalayas both contain extreme varieties that cannot 
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interbreed.
44
 This does not mean that, taxonomically, we should put  Glog 
and Homo sapiens on the same level as, say, Asians and Africans or men 
and women. Biology, especially botany, has and continues correctly to 
maintain various infraspecific ranks employed to register morphological 
and other differences between members of the same species. Speaking 
fairly loosely, I would put Glog at the level of Homo sapiens as varieties 
or subspecies of rational animal (note: a subspecies is not a species any 
more than a rubber duck is a duck), male and female as subvarieties of 
Homo sapiens (if Glog has a gender, do the same), and the different races 
as different forms of each of the two subvarieties (where ‘form’ is not 
used in the overarching Aristotelian sense but in a sense more akin to 
botany). 
5. Superhumans 
Exotic rational animals of the type exemplified by Glog are decidedly not 
what transhumanists have in mind when they speak, as they sometimes 
do, of a new posthuman species. What they are thinking of is an animal 
that is bigger, better, brainier than us poor Homo sapiens, enhanced by 
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technology. So why bring exotic creatures into the picture? The reason is 
that if we can make the case for a Glog-like being to be one of us, a 
human in the metaphysical sense, then we can surely make the case for 
the superhuman of transhumanist fantasy. 
We cannot take the easy way out by arguing that since what 
transhumanists have in mind is a superhuman, all they are really speaking 
of is a human being with enhanced powers, and so a fortiori a human 
being. Nor, contrarily, can we argue that since what they have in mind is 
something like Superman, they mean a distinct species of human-looking 
creature, human on the outside but all special powers beyond human ken 
on the inside. What we have to do is to think about the sort of exotic case 
I have outlined: if such a creature were indeed one of us, why wouldn’t 
the same apply a fortiori to any creature engineered on this earth 
according to the laws of nature prevailing here, using pre-existing human 
material (distasteful though this terminology may be)? Such a being 
could only be more like Homo sapiens in appearance, structure, and 
function, than any exotic being we could dream of. 
At this point I want to advance an a priori argument, wholly 
general in nature, that in my view guarantees the falsity of the extreme 
transhumanist claim that we could engineer a new species. In considering 
Glog-like cases, I had in mind only the question of horizontal species 
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difference, by which I mean the question of whether there could be a non-
human rational animal that, although extremely different from us in many 
ways, was not necessarily more capable than us of doing anything in 
particular – not stronger, smarter, possessed of extraordinary powers we 
could only wish we had, and so on. The transhumanist, by contrast, thinks 
a new species would be an example of vertical difference – a species 
made distinct precisely by its superhuman powers of cognition, strength, 
speed, agility, extended lifespan, resistance to damage, capacity to heal 
itself, and the like. Would these sorts of transcendent powers make for a 
new species?  
My answer is the old Aristotelian-Scholastic maxim: plus vel minus 
non mutat speciem. No difference of degree could ever change the 
species. Knowing more, living longer, being stronger…none of these 
could ever turn a human into a non-human, or be that in virtue of which 
one being was human and another not. All would be rational animals, 
humans in the true metaphysical sense regardless of how we classified 
them based on narrow biology alone. Here is the a priori argument in full. 
A superhuman in the transhumanist sense either has more rationality or 
more animality. (For example, if it knows more it has more rationality; if 
it is stronger it has more animality. This is a deliberately forced way of 
speaking, but I cannot think of a preferable way of making the point.) No 
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difference of degree can make for a difference of species. So the 
superhuman would still be of the same species, namely a rational animal. 
How, then, could a new but superior non-human species be brought into 
existence? In one of only two ways. First, it could be a being with 
rationality but without animality.
45
 It would, in other words, have to be a 
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 It might be objected that a rational being that lacked animality would not have to be 
a disembodied mind/spirit. It could be an ‘upload’, as the transhumanist terminology 
has it – a person transferred from their original body to an inorganic substrate of 
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technology could preserve a person’s identity via ‘uploading’, the person would not 
have turned into a new species of embodied (or at least spatio-temporally located) 
rational being that was not at the same time an animal. For the person to be remotely 
capable of functioning, she would need some kind of body to enable her to interact 
with the world and with other persons. She would need perceptual organs, without 
which she would not be able to take in the data required for even basic mental 
operations. If the ‘upload’ really were a person, she would have to be capable of 
sensory, affective and volitional behaviour. The sort of body able to make that 
possible would have to possess the basic features of any animal body, no matter the 
specific differences from a typical human body made of biological material. I can see 
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disembodied rational creature – a spirit or, as traditional theists hold, an 
angel. Secondly, it could be something even more extreme – a being 
without rationality or animality in the senses in which I have 
characterized them, yet superior to us humans.
46
 Such an entity would, 
quite simply, be God. God is not an animal in the sense of having a body 
that carries out the vegetative and sensory functions. Nevertheless, on the 
traditional conception God perceives and acts, and is considered 
(analogically) to be a living being. Nor is God rational in the sense of 
composing and dividing concepts, making judgments and drawing 
inferences. Yet in another sense God is supremely rational because He is 
omniscient. An omniscient being does not need to put two and two 
together to get four, as it were: there is nothing to be composed or 
divided, no judgments to be made or inferences drawn, no reasoning to 
carry out, because an omniscient being already knows all the connections 
between everything without exception. We can, by analogy, still call this 
a kind of rationality. 
                                                                                                                                           
 
no more reason for denying that such a person were one of us than for denying it of 
our mythical exotic alien. 
46
 It could not have animality without rationality and still be superior, so that option is 
ruled out. 
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So where does that leave us? The only way a rational animal could 
become something greater and distinct in species is by losing its 
animality or its rationality in the way just described. It would have to 
become an angel or God (or a god, if that makes sense).
47
 And the only 
way an entity could exist that was both superior to and distinct from 
rational animals is by being either an angel or God (or a god). It is 
obvious that no human being can be God (or a god), or of the same 
species as God (or a god).
48
 But humans would not be of the same species 
as any angel either since, being disembodied, angels have a wholly 
different means of cognition: at no level of generality can they be said to 
                                                 
 
47
 On the traditional scholastic view, God is not a member of any species. So I am 
really speaking of God as a being of a wholly different order to the species rational 
animal. Angels, on the other hand, are argued by St Thomas Aquinas to be all 
singleton members of distinct species: see Summa Theologica I, q.50, a.4 on the 
angels (Eng. trans. by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province, vol. 3, London: 
Burns Oates and Washbourne, 1922: 13-14); on God as not being a member of a 
species, see ST I, q.3, a.5 (vol. 1, London: R. and. T. Washbourne, 1911: 37-9). 
48
 Not just because God is not a member of any species. Even if He were, he would 
not be of the same species as human beings. 
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know things in the same way that humans know them.
49
 I can see how, to 
borrow a phrase from Wyndham Lewis, transhumanists might seek to be 
the apes of God, but I hope I do not have to argue for the proposition that 
no application of reason could ever produce or turn something into God 
or a spirit. 
6. Conclusion – an ethical implication 
If what I have argued is correct, it is no more than an exemplification of 
the thesis that there is and can be nothing in between humans and angels. 
If there is an ontological hierarchy, as I believe, then from God we 
descend to spirits and then human beings. There is no space between the 
rational animals and the disembodied spirits, metaphysically speaking. 
Superhumans, therefore, will always be one of us no matter how 
different they seem. At which many will wonder – who cares? What 
difference does it make whether we correctly call a posthuman or 
superhuman a member of our species or a member of a distinct species? 
One might, in other words, wonder whether the issue is more than a 
verbal one. Suppose the transhumanist concedes the metaphysical point: a 
superhuman would not belong to a new species distinct from human 
                                                 
 
49
 Angels are traditionally held to know things by a kind of intellectual apprehension, 
a direct knowledge unmediated by sensory impulses. For Aquinas on angelic 
knowledge, see ST I, qq.54-58 (vol. 3: 41-94).  
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beings; both it and we would all belong to the rational animal kind. 
Nevertheless, the superhuman would be a superior ‘variety’, so to speak, 
of rational animal. As the Mastiff is to the Poodle in strength; as the 
German Shepherd is to the Afghan Hound in intelligence, and so on; so 
the superhuman would be to the ordinary human, multiplied by much 
larger factors. The facts that matter – that are of any practical interest –
would be the same, whatever the species allocation. 
I propose, however, at least one rather interesting and surprising 
ethical implication that does make this more than an abstruse 
metaphysical question – contra Harris’s thought mentioned earlier that 
species allocation is of no ethical consequence. One of the issues 
transhumanists worry about is whether a future posthuman class would 
inevitably dominate and enslave the existing human population.
50
 I tend 
to side with the more pessimistic view, but what interests me is the nature 
of any such conflict assuming the correctness of what I have argued. It is 
an old truth that civil wars are usually nastier, bloodier, and more 
traumatic than those fought against an outside enemy. If our posthuman 
class were indeed of a different species – if we did not recognize them as 
one of us – any purported domination of us by them would parallel the 
invasion of one nation by another, and our self-defence would be 
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 See, for example, Bostrom, ‘The Transhumanist FAQ’,  sec. 3.9. 
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something like collective resistance against an external aggressor. Such 
wars generate much internal unity and cohesion in the face of the outside 
threat. Differences are put aside and people rally together to defeat the 
common foe. 
By contrast, civil wars are messy and shocking affairs in a more 
unpleasant way. Brother fights brother, neighbours and relatives can find 
themselves in arms against each other, the common land is laid waste and 
everyone suffers. The scar on the national psyche is long lasting, whoever 
wins. Now, if the transhuman class really were one of us, any attempt by 
it to subjugate the ‘unenhanced’ humans, coupled with our resistance to 
their threatened domination, would result in a civil war. True, we would 
have to recognize the transhuman class as one of us, and as I indicated 
earlier, people have sometimes made mistakes about whether other 
humans belong to their species. So it is contingent whether a de facto 
civil war would be seen as such, with all the psychic and emotional 
consequences. But we should now be thinking not of the far-fetched, 
Glog-like case, which I used to make a metaphysical point about species 
membership even at the extreme end (and about likely mutual 
recognition), but of the far more realistic scenarios transhumanists have 
in mind. In these, super-engineered ‘posthumans’ are far more likely to 
be recognized as beings of our own species – albeit privileged over the 
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rest of us to a prodigious degree. One might dispute my claim that even in 
the exotic case, sufficient interaction across enough dimensions and for a 
long enough period of time would likely lead to mutual recognition of 
conspecificity; but on the more plausible scenarios, such recognition 
seems all but guaranteed. 
Now, whether Homo sapiens or our transhuman brothers emerged 
victorious in the war of domination, some humans would have to crush 
members of their own species; this must have a traumatic psychological 
effect of a different order from that involved in subjugating a distinct 
species. (If a lion could speak, the first thing he would express is his 
shock at our callously easy exploitation of his kind.) Were the 
transhumans to triumph, the result would not be analogous to the 
temporary occupation of a foreign land. Rather, it would be the 
permanent occupation of one’s own land by one’s own kind – a 
conspecific boot on the human face forever. Even absent outright 
conflict, resentment at extreme inequality, leading to a virtually 
permanent state of unrest, would be guaranteed – just as, again by 
imperfect analogy, people are naturally far more agitated about there 
being obscenely and disproportionately rich people in their own country 
than they are about those in some other land. Unable to transcend our 
own species, then, pessimistic transhumanism requires the human race to 
WARNING – AUTHOR COPY ONLY. NOT OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. NOT 
FOR CITATION. OFFICIAL VERSION IS PUBLISHED IN: The Southern Journal 
of Philosophy 52 (2014): 206-26 
                                                                                                                     43 
 
 
turn on itself. I for one hope that the limits of ‘applied reason’ will keep 
such an awful spectacle forever at possible world’s length.51 
                                                 
 
51
 An earlier version of this paper was delivered in 2012 at the Wake Forest 
University conference on Engineering Human Nature and the Future of Human 
Values. I am grateful to Kevin Jung, organizer of the conference, for the invitation, 
and to the audience for their comments. I would also like to thank two anonymous 
referees for a number of suggestions that have further improved the paper. 
